In 1940 the British were bustled unceremoniously out of Europe. The Battle of France and the Norwegian Campaign had been humiliating disasters for a nation unaccustomed to such obvious military defeat. Britain would not surrender – national pride insisted on that – and the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force provided immunity from invasion, but with her army in the UK reduced to just one fully equipped division, neither could she contemplate taking on the might of the German Wehrmacht on land for a very long time to come. The British had to be seen to be prosecuting the war, but with what? One solution might be by a massive bombing campaign, designed to destroy German industry and break the morale of her people, but it would be some time before there were the bombers with the range, the navigation equipment and the load carrying capacity to have much effect, never mind the long range fighters needed to escort them. The immediate response to the need to hit back and to be seen to be hitting back was to have recourse to what the British considered that they always did rather well – subversion, raids and sabotage, allowing full rein to that streak of eccentricity and individualism that has long been supposed to form part of the quintessential British, or at least English, national character. Particularly attractive to a political establishment that had always hoped to spend as little as possible on its armed forces, and to chiefs of staff who found that they had few assets with which to do anything else, was the premise that butcher-and-bolt operations carried out by small numbers of men would cost little, not only in terms of money, but in equipment and lives too. Successful operations could be trumpeted to the international rooftops, those that failed (in the event, most) could easily be hushed up.
A very good question and one that isn’t asked enough. I for one have become something of an SOE heretic. Whilst admiring the remarkable achievements of some individuals, I’m not sure that the overall intended strategic result was achieved or the ultimate effect was worth it. However, we also need to recognise that what isn’t in doubt - asking the question of those who took part - is that many saw the threat from Germany to be existential, and needful of their direct, personal and individual sacrifice. Thousands of individuals volunteered to make a personal sacrifice in the face of overwhelmingly poor odds. This is a question that to my mind hasn’t been satisfactorily answered. There are some amazing letters from individuals going on the St Nazaire raid, recognising that they didn’t think they’d survive, but willing nevertheless to sacrifice their lives in an operation their country considered necessary
A very good question and one that isn’t asked enough. I for one have become something of an SOE heretic. Whilst admiring the remarkable achievements of some individuals, I’m not sure that the overall intended strategic result was achieved or the ultimate effect was worth it. However, we also need to recognise that what isn’t in doubt - asking the question of those who took part - is that many saw the threat from Germany to be existential, and needful of their direct, personal and individual sacrifice. Thousands of individuals volunteered to make a personal sacrifice in the face of overwhelmingly poor odds. This is a question that to my mind hasn’t been satisfactorily answered. There are some amazing letters from individuals going on the St Nazaire raid, recognising that they didn’t think they’d survive, but willing nevertheless to sacrifice their lives in an operation their country considered necessary