I have been asked to review Indian Soldier of World War I. My review is below. I suspect it may not be published. INDIAN SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR I by Andrew T Jarboe It is perhaps inevitable, in these times of ‘Black Lives Matter’ and campaigns to ‘decolonialise history’ – whatever that may mean – that an American academic should approach the experiences of the Indian Army in the First World War from the assumption that the British Empire was based on the exploitation of non-white races by their white masters. One wonders whether the author has any military experience, whether he has ever been to India and whether he speaks any Indian languages. It is a shame that he is so ignorant of the realities of Empire, or so determined to portray it as evil, for there is much good in this book if only he had not approached his subject with a closed mind. He says that as a result of racist attitudes by commanders Indian units on the Western Front were not given relief from the trenches as British units were, and to an extent this was true in 1914 during and immediately after the First Battle of Ypres. This was not, however, due to ‘racist’ attitudes on the part of commanders but simply because while British battalions at war establishment numbered 1000 all ranks, Indian battalions were but 720 strong and hence more battalions were needed to cover a divisional front. By 1915 divisional fronts were adjusted and Indian battalions got the same share of time in support and reserve lines as their British comrades. He peddles the old chestnut that the mutiny of 1857 was caused by the issue of cartridges greased with a mixture of pig and beef fat. In fact nobody knew what the grease was made of but the Indian Army swiftly agreed a monetary allowance to allow the soldiers to purchase vegetable grease. The causes of the mutiny were far more complex than the issue of cartridges and were resolved on the disbandment of the East India Company and the assumption of direct rule by the crown. In any case the mutiny was put down largely by Indian and Gurkha troops, for there were very few British units available. Jarboe has failed to understand the rank system of the Indian army, telling us that a subedar major was a sergeant – the reality is that a subedar major was the senior Viceroy Commissioned Officer in a battalion, the commanding officer’s right hand man, ranking very much higher than a sergeant. The author does not understand, or has chosen not to understand, why there were differences in military law applicable to British and Indian soldiers. In fact the conditions applicable to the latter were not oppressive (flogging of Indian soldiers was abolished long before it was for British troops) and were based on the cultural differences between them. To say, as the author does, that the severest punishment that could be awarded to a British officer was three years imprisonment, whereas an Indian officer could be sentenced to death is nonsense. Similarly salaries were based on the cost of living in the man’s home country, hence British soldiers were paid more than Indians, although the purchasing power at home was roughly the same. The author brands the Indian Army recruiting policy as ‘racist’ (by which he means discriminatory and unfair), but however unfashionable it may be to say so in 2023, the facts are that some races are better at soldiering than others (would you want to go to war with 20 Gurkhas behind you or 100 Italians? I know which this reviewer would choose, although if he was opening a restaurant he might come to a different conclusion). The Indian Army recruited from those classes that over many years and numerous small wars had proved their martial abilities and loyalty – it would have been foolish in the extreme to do otherwise. It would be tedious to continue, suffice to say that the Author simply does not understand how the Indian Army worked and what the relationship between British Officers and their Indian and Gurkha soldiers was – 720 men would not have followed eleven officers if they did not believe in them, and only those who passed out in the top ten percent from the Royal Military College were accepted as officers in the Indian Army. The generals in Mesopotamia were not racist, as the author insists, but simply incompetent. A great deal of work has gone into this book – twenty-four pages of source notes alone – but it is not history. It is propaganda.
Hi Gordon -- late to the party but I'm new to your site. Thanks for the excellent review, I learned a few things (notably the myths over the 1857 mutiny), and I was struck by your common-sense point about pay and cost of living. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that Ghurka pay was still adjusted based upon old Indian Army rates until relatively recently -- but is now equal to the rest of the British Army?
One point that might be food for thought: I think a huge part of the Italian failures can be put down to (a) lack of motivation -- there simply wasn't the will to conquer that the Germans had -- (b) the appalling treatment of the ORs by the officer corps -- (c) the demoralization that must surely have resulted from having equipment that was sub-standard compared to the Germans and British. When properly trained, equipped, and led, the Italians did fight well -- Rommel was unstinting in his praise for the Ariete armoured division. I think Major Hans von Luck also had very good things to say about the Auto-Sahariana formation recce company attached to his battalion as the Afrika Korp's right flank.
Yes you are right about the Italians in WW1, they fought well under very indifferent officers and had 400,000 deaths. In WW2 their corps on the Eastern Front was very good, until Mussolini insisted in expanding it into an army, and in N Africa some of their units were excellent. I was referring to today’s Italian Army which is a joke. Re Gurkhas, because the Tripartite Agreement, which allows us to recruit Gurkhas, said that the pay in the British and Nepal armies was to be the same as that of the Indian army our chaps basic pay was as for India. Out of India a man could not survive on Indian army pay so we added allowances to give the Gurkha in the British army the same take home pay as his British counterpart, allowing for the fact that the latter paid income tax and food and accomodation charges which the Gurkha did not This has now been rationalised and the Gurkha is now paid in exactly the same way, and with exactly the same deductions as any other soldier of the British army. Many thanks for your comments.
Hi Gordon, thanks for clarifying on the pay and benefits -- makes sense to me. I think a book on the Italian Army in World War 2 would make an interesting read as a comparative study to the other major nations. I remember reading one a few years back but it was short on detail and VERY short on personal narratives. Never worked with the Italians during my own time in the green so couldn't say that they're like these days. Will have to take your word for it.
Nations that joined WW1 a little later are interesting: from my reading the Italians certainly were unprepared in every way; but so were the Romanians who joined in 1916 and really should have known better by that stage. In particular, they were short of artillery shells (estimated expenditure compared to actual expenditure was wildly out of whack) and had no industrial capacity to make up this shortfall. Sad how history keeps repeating itself in this sort of way ...
Great to hear some reflections from perspectives that are seldom heard these days so I look forward to reading more about Ghurkas and Monty and Napoleonic militia.
About time that facts and context were introduced into the writing of history. Maybe it’s to be filed under the heading of fiction. Many thanks and keep up the good work.
Hi Gordon -- late to the party but I'm new to your site. Thanks for the excellent review, I learned a few things (notably the myths over the 1857 mutiny), and I was struck by your common-sense point about pay and cost of living. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that Ghurka pay was still adjusted based upon old Indian Army rates until relatively recently -- but is now equal to the rest of the British Army?
One point that might be food for thought: I think a huge part of the Italian failures can be put down to (a) lack of motivation -- there simply wasn't the will to conquer that the Germans had -- (b) the appalling treatment of the ORs by the officer corps -- (c) the demoralization that must surely have resulted from having equipment that was sub-standard compared to the Germans and British. When properly trained, equipped, and led, the Italians did fight well -- Rommel was unstinting in his praise for the Ariete armoured division. I think Major Hans von Luck also had very good things to say about the Auto-Sahariana formation recce company attached to his battalion as the Afrika Korp's right flank.
Yes you are right about the Italians in WW1, they fought well under very indifferent officers and had 400,000 deaths. In WW2 their corps on the Eastern Front was very good, until Mussolini insisted in expanding it into an army, and in N Africa some of their units were excellent. I was referring to today’s Italian Army which is a joke. Re Gurkhas, because the Tripartite Agreement, which allows us to recruit Gurkhas, said that the pay in the British and Nepal armies was to be the same as that of the Indian army our chaps basic pay was as for India. Out of India a man could not survive on Indian army pay so we added allowances to give the Gurkha in the British army the same take home pay as his British counterpart, allowing for the fact that the latter paid income tax and food and accomodation charges which the Gurkha did not This has now been rationalised and the Gurkha is now paid in exactly the same way, and with exactly the same deductions as any other soldier of the British army. Many thanks for your comments.
Hi Gordon, thanks for clarifying on the pay and benefits -- makes sense to me. I think a book on the Italian Army in World War 2 would make an interesting read as a comparative study to the other major nations. I remember reading one a few years back but it was short on detail and VERY short on personal narratives. Never worked with the Italians during my own time in the green so couldn't say that they're like these days. Will have to take your word for it.
Nations that joined WW1 a little later are interesting: from my reading the Italians certainly were unprepared in every way; but so were the Romanians who joined in 1916 and really should have known better by that stage. In particular, they were short of artillery shells (estimated expenditure compared to actual expenditure was wildly out of whack) and had no industrial capacity to make up this shortfall. Sad how history keeps repeating itself in this sort of way ...
Great to hear some reflections from perspectives that are seldom heard these days so I look forward to reading more about Ghurkas and Monty and Napoleonic militia.
About time that facts and context were introduced into the writing of history. Maybe it’s to be filed under the heading of fiction. Many thanks and keep up the good work.
Excellent. Thanks for the warning Gordon.