THOUGHTS ON THE WAR IN UKRAINE - PART THREE
THOUGHTS ON THE WAR IN UKRAINE - PART THREE
The aim of the first phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was political – take the capital, the seat of government and you have taken the country. When this thrust failed and was withdrawn, the second phase was strategic: an attack out of Donetsk along the northern coast of the Black Sea. The aim there was, firstly, to create a land bridge to the Crimea. Although annexed by Russia in 2014 the Crimea had no overland link to Russia proper, all communication being either by air, sea or by a hastily constructed bridge across the sea of Azov. To consolidate the land bridge necessitated the taking of Mariupol, stubbornly defended by the Azov battalion which, once the Russians had surrounded the city on 2 March, withdrew into the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works, an industrial complex riddled with tunnels and underground storerooms, ideal for defence. After initial infantry assaults were beaten back the Russians reverted to their traditional tactic of massive artillery and rocket bombardment which, according to the United Nations, destroyed ninety-five percent of the city. Civilian casualties are unknown but must have been in the tens of thousands. The siege went on for almost eleven weeks, until 16 May when the garrison, out of ammunition, food and water surrendered. The Azov battalion had been raised from the extreme right wing Azov political party. This had little Ukrainian public support, having got less than 3 percent of the vote in the 2019 general election that brought Vladimir Zelensky to power. Despite this, the party’s rhetoric allowed Putin and the Russian publicity machine to hold the battalion as examples of the ‘Nazis’ that they claimed were in control in Ukraine, and allowed them to claim that the survivors would be treated as war criminals rather than as prisoners of war. In the event at least some have since been released in a prisoner exchange.
Although the Russians did capture Mariupol, the siege seriously delayed the timing of the advance along the coast, as instead of deploying all their forces on the next objective, Kherson, the equivalent of two divisions had to be diverted to Mariupol. Kherson was nevertheless captured on 6 March after a six day siege. This was significant as Kherson is the capital of Kherson Oblast. Ukraine is divided into twenty-four administrative oblasts, or counties, and Kherson was the only county capital captured by the Russians. The Russians hoped to continue their advance, capturing Odessa and then linking up with Transnistria a separatist-controlled slice of eastern Moldova, recognised by Russia, but by no one else, as an independent people’s republic. Had the Russians been able to do this, they would then have cut Ukraine off from the sea, inflicting massive economic damage, as the rail links to the west, to Poland, are insufficient to replace the sea routes. As it was, a mix of fierce resistance and the sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, stalled the Russian land advance and forced the withdrawal of the naval close blockade.
A Russian threat to sink any ships emerging from Ukrainian ports, and mining by both sides, prevented the export of Ukrainian wheat (her major export) but when it became clear that most of that wheat went to Africa and the Middle East, where Russia is anxious to make friends, Turkey negotiated an agreement. This allowed exports to continue with ships going to and returning from Ukrainian ports being inspected in Turkish ports to ensure that they are not carrying war materials. At the end of October, after a Ukrainian drone attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, Russia withdrew from the agreement, returning a few days later when urged by the United Nations Secretary General to do so.
Currently Russian forces have completed a withdrawal from Kherson which, at the time of writing, has been re-occupied by Ukrainian troops. It will be interesting to see how this is portrayed to the Russian public, initially announced by a bald statement by General Surovikin on Russian television. Presumably it will be painted as a tactical redeployment, as it is, although it is also a humiliating defeat.
Rumour, counter rumour, statement and counter statement are of course rife, as they are in any war zone. As both the BBC and ITV and all the major British newspapers have reporters on the ground and on the front line with the Ukrainian forces, information coming from there is more reliable than that coming from Russia. We do have news agencies and reporters in Russia, particularly in Moscow, but none embedded with the Russian armed forces. That said, one should be wary of casualty figures coming out, almost certainly understated by the Russians and, in the case of civilian casualties, possibly overstated by Ukraine. Similarly, we would be advised not to accept some reports, such as that of an artillery ammunition resupply from North Korea to Russia, without further evidence.
On the ground the latest development is the emergence of a small number of the Russian T14 Armata, a much-trumpeted tank first displayed on the Victory Day parade of May 2015. This has an unmanned turret, a 125 mm smooth bore gun, ceramic armour, explosive reactive armour, and a crew of three which was said (by the Russians) to be a generation ahead of the latest Western tanks. An original production target of 2,300 to be in service by 2020 was cancelled in 2018. This writer is unsure what the present production run is, but it is known that there were significant production and financial problems with the project. As at present Russian armoured units have been dependant on the T72, a tank that first came into service in 1969, and despite having been upgraded several times since, is still an old tank. In Gulf War II one British Challenger knocked out fourteen T 72. Admittedly the latter were manned by Iraqis and were not the most modern mark, but the comparison is relevant. We await to see the contribution of the T14, but it will almost certainly still be vulnerable to the NLAW and the American equivalent, operated by determined and well-trained troops.
While predictions in any war are dangerous, I suspect that Russia will continue to rely on massive artillery strikes, reducing objectives to rubble before deploying increasingly young. Reluctant and half trained infantry conscripts, now increased by a call up of several hundred thousand reservists and those previously exempt. As I have said many times, Ukraine does not to have to win this war, it has to not lose it. The biggest danger is for the West, in the grip of huge increases in the supply of energy, to put pressure on Ukraine to come to terms. This would be disastrous as proof that if Russia perseveres long enough NATO will fold. And the next step? The Baltic states?