DEFENCE – OR THE LACK OF IT
Currently NATO is at war with Russia by proxy. We are arming, training and advising the Ukrainians and supplying them with intelligence. Only Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which says that an attack on one is an attack on all, prevents Putin from launching a missile attack on a British convoy trundling through Poland laden with ammunition for Ukraine – a legitimate military target. That could change if Putin was on the back foot and thought the polity of Russia was at stake, which could happen if a Ukrainian offensive drove deep into territory indisputably Russian. This is unlikely, but cannot be entirely discounted, as nor can the possible deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons. The most powerful NATO member is of course the USA, which has supplied the largest quantity of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine (Britain is the second largest contributor). As long as American support for Ukraine remains firm then NATO will remain united, but continued US support is by no means guaranteed. 2024 is a presidential election year. The two possibles for the Republican nomination are Trump and De Santis. Trump is at best lukewarm on NATO and is in any case unpredictable, and De Santis has stated openly that he regards the war in Ukraine as a mere territorial dispute. Should either win then the alliance would be less resolute. The withdrawal of wholehearted American support would expose the weaknesses in NATO resolve that are already present. France is ambivalent and Macron is in any case anxious to promote a European identity separate from the United States. So far this has only been publicly expressed in regard to relations with China, but successive French governments have been resentful of ‘Les Anglo Saxons’ and this is unlikely to change. Throughout the Merkel era Germany became more and more dependent upon Russia, particularly for oil and gas, and her armed forces are a joke, a sad reflection on a nation that from the time of the Great Elector to 1945 fielded the finest army with the finest soldiers in Europe[*].
Should proxy war escalate to hot war then where does Britain stand? While the British army is probably the most professional in NATO, well led, well trained and reasonably well equipped, it is pitifully small. At the beginning of the First World War we sent four divisions to the Western Front and eventually fielded sixty on the Western Front alone. We started the Second World War with eleven divisions increasing to forty-four. That does not include Empire divisions. Now, we could, just, put one division in the field. Even before the Ukraine war ammunition stocks were at a low level and would have run out in a few weeks even before the contributions to Ukraine. How have we got to this parlous situation? Defence expenditure is decided by governments and one must therefore ask what is the aim of a politician? The aim of a politician – any politician – is to get into power and once there to stay there, with all the access to turtle soup, patronage and the ability to do favours for acolytes. They do this by bribing a greedy and ignorant electorate, the members of which want instant gratification and are only interested in that which affects them personally.
Where does the funding for these bribes come from? It cannot be from cutting welfare, or the already terminally ramshackle NHS, or by increased taxation, so it has to come from something which the electorate do not notice. The obvious cash cow is, of course, Defence which for many years has been raided by governments of all parties. ‘The Peace Dividend’, ‘An Army Smaller but Better’ (or smaller but bitter, as we who were in it said), ‘Front Line First’ (strip out the logistic units without which no army can function), these, and other equally fatuous cries, enabled constant reductions in the defence vote without the public noticing – or, for the most part, caring. It is rather like not bothering to insure your house, and hoping that by the time it catches fire, you will have moved.
The Royal Navy is in slightly better shape, as befits an island nation, but again while it is still (just) the second biggest in NATO it has not nearly enough frigates and destroyers, the workhorses of the fleet and essential to protect the fleet carriers. The Royal Air Force faces regular reductions in the number of modern aircraft it wants and needs, and takes far too long to train its fast jet pilots.
Currently the amount we spend on defence per head of the population is almost exactly half that of the USA, and while the USA could simply pull up the drawbridge and exist perfectly well, we, who import around one third of the food we eat, could not. It is true that we do meet the NATO minimum spend of 2% of GDP, (8% in the sixties) but then so does Greece whose armed forces only exist to annoy the Turks and would barely manage to win a bar room brawl. That 2% is itself a fudge, for it includes my army pension, and splendid fellow that I might be, I no longer contribute to the defence of the nation.
Were we to find ourselves in direct conflict with Russia we would no longer have the entire resources of the Empire in support. In both world wars we could call upon the Indian army, alas unlikely to be available next time. Canada, Australia and New Zealand would probably step up, but their armies are even smaller than ours. Unless there is a very rapid expansion of our armed forces, a very great deal of extra expenditure and armament factories spurred into churning out weapons a lot faster than they do now, a hot war with Russia, without the United States, would end with Slavs holding victory parades down Whitehall. Russian generals are incompetent, their tactics are pedestrian, their soldiers callow, undertrained and increasingly reluctant, but there are a very great many of them, and while one good ‘un may well beat five bad ‘uns, he is unlikely to be able to take on ten, however incompetent the latter might be.
[*] And for those who say ‘so how come they were beaten?’ the answer is that you cannot take on the British Empire, the USSR and the USA all at the same time, and that is a factor of geography, population, economics and industrial capacity.
Gordon,
Been a big fan since first introduced to MUD, BLOOD, AND POPPYCOCK about 18 years ago by a British Army officer friend of mine (Brigadier (Ret'd) Simon Banton). Love your work on YouTube also at the Western Front Association.
Having said all that, I strongly agree with the tone of this post, but I must retort against some of your assertions.
1) The Wehrmacht/Heer and the Waffen SS hit their tactical apogee in late 1942, early 1943 and then began a precipitous tumble until total defeat in May 1945. The defeats in North Africa, Sicily, and Stalingrad bled out most of their tactical skill base and their defeat in January 1945 during the Battle of the Bulge finished them off. By early 1945, the U.S. and British armies in the ETO were as good as the Germans ever were at the tactical level (1940-1942) and even better at the operational art (and clearly/always superior in logistics and strategic warfare). That the Germans were able to still inflict tremendous casualties on the Soviets up until early May 1945 are due to them 1) being on the defensive with all the advantages that affords and 2) fighting a tactically inept, but operationally superior, force. The Russians have never been particularly good at the division and below level, but their superb skill at the operational art, along with superior manpower and material numbers, allowed them to mitigate that.
2) "While the British army is probably the most professional in NATO, well led, well trained and reasonably well equipped, it is pitifully small." While the use of 'probably' gives you some wiggle room, the British Army of today (last eight or so years) is not the British Army of the BAOR or even the 1991 Gulf War. Senior officer bloat, officer and NCO careerism, gong-chasing---these are critiques from friends of mine in HM Armed Forces and a number of candid critiques such as in THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD and LOSING SMALL WARS. Quality can offset some level of quantity, but not as much as some would believe--and frankly, the quality is not there as it once was.
3) "Now, we could, just, put one division in the field." Maybe, and barely if so, and then only for a few weeks at best with the entire Regular Army and Army Reserve committed to supporting it. At current levels of manning and equipping, I think the British would be hard pressed to indefinitely (6 months or longer) sustain a three battlegroup Brigade. The British were stressed getting to Basra in 2003 with a two-brigade division.
4) I think you are optimistic on your appraisal of the Royal Navy, but fortunately, no one but the Chinese have a capable hostile navy, so they can get away with their troubles for a bit more time (but not much longer as the USN is in dreadful turmoil too).
5) "Canada, Australia and New Zealand would probably step up, but their armies are even smaller than ours." And unfortunately, their contributions would be marginal. The regular forces strength of the entire HM Armed Forces, ADF, Canadian Defence Forces, and the RNZ Armed Forces equals about 70% of just the active U.S. Army. I have been in bigger American brigades than the entire NZ Army. Quantity counts and while niche, boutique capabilities are useful, the ability to absorb enemy blows, cover and control large swaths of terrain and populace, and quickly reinforce and reconstitute units and regenerate forces quickly matters in large wars, as you well know. American military officers weep at and lament what we have seen our most reliable allies withered down to.
If Germany had not invaded the Soviets, history might have turned out quite differently. Britain was hanging in by the slenderest of threads and the USA cares more about the pacific theater than to chaos in Europe