A MILITARY HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS - PART TWO
ANGLO AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS – PART TWO
The United States of America came into the First World War on the side of the British, although there were those cynical souls who averred that the United States had made so many loans to the Allies that unless she ensured an Anglo-French victory she would never get paid. There can be no doubt that however much the American political establishment was irritated by the British (and there was much to be irritated about) neither president nor cabinet were in much doubt that the British way of doing things was to be preferred to the German. As the years 1900 to 1917 had seen the arrival in the United States of over one million German immigrants, to add to those already there, particularly in the mid-west, persuading the population of the merits of the British cause was another matter entirely. On entering the war America faced an even greater challenge than did the British, for with a population more than twice that of Britain’s she had in 1917 a regular army a quarter of the size of Britain’s in 1914. The problems of raising a mass army, equipping, training and moving it were immense, and it was to the great advantage of the British that the relationship established between their commander-in-chief on the Western Front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and the commander of the American Expeditionary Force, General John J Pershing, was genuinely warm and born of mutual respect, so much so that on many occasions Pershing was prepared to give direct military support to the British, while telling his president that the involvement was but ‘training’.
Between the wars Anglo-American rivalry centred on the seas. There were those in America who were no longer prepared to accept British naval supremacy, and US threats to out-build the Royal Navy only reinforced the views of some in Britain who felt that if it came to a showdown, Britain should row in with Japan rather than with America. Fortunately those views were a minority (although shared by the British ambassador to Japan), but while the United States joined the war on the British side in 1941, military relations were not always good. Initially Americans resented the undoubted fact that the British had more experience of fighting Germans and Italians than they did, and it was unfortunate that some British commanders did not exercise the tact that might have defused some Americans’ distrust of British motives. The Americans liked Alexander, they did not like Montgomery. While Haig and Pershing in the First War ensured a harmonious working relationship, the interplay between Montgomery and Eisenhower poisoned Anglo-American relationships on a personal level for years after the Second World War. Personal relationships might not have mattered had the one not become the professional head of the British army and written his memoirs, while the other became President of the USA. Eisenhower later said that the biggest mistake of his presidency was to fail to support the United Kingdom over Suez, and we might speculate as to how much Montgomery’s denigration of Eisenhower’s military skills contributed to American unhelpfulness in Britain’s last attempt to remain an imperial power.
Anglo-American military cooperation after 1945 was centred on NATO, although the British provided the Commonwealth Division for the Korean War. The priority for both nations then became the containment of the Soviet Union. Soviet tentacles spread much farther than just Eastern Europe, and British efforts to deal with communist inspired risings in the Gulf and Borneo were not always appreciated by America, nor were the British fully supportive of American efforts in Vietnam. An initial intention to provide a Gurkha brigade to join Australian and New Zealand troops in Vietnam was withdrawn by Prime Minister Wilson (probably wisely). British victory in the Falklands was helped enormously by United States support, military as well as political, but at the time it could by no means be assumed, and twenty years earlier might well not have been forthcoming. The United States eventually spent her way to victory in the Cold War, and in many ways the world became a more unstable – and hence more dangerous – place. The collapse of the USSR released age-old tensions that communist dictatorships had held in check, and British and American forces found themselves cooperating in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Here the differences in American and British military methods were starkly outlined. Put simply, the Americans are very good at making war – none better – while the British are very good at keeping peace. Both skills are needed, but the differences in emphasis are not always understood by the other partner. Britain supplied troops in both Gulf wars (in the second almost a third of the troops involved on land) but in the aftermath of the war-fighting phase their differences in concept and approach were exposed.
The armed forces of the two nations are very different, and not only in scale. On independence the fledgling republic adopted the military system with which it was familiar – that of the British – but contrasting threats, dissimilar priorities and changes in the societies from whence those armed forces are drawn have produced armies, navies and air forces that are very different, and not only in uniforms and weaponry. That said, in any NATO or western coalition headquarters, while there may be Greeks, Italian and Spanish senior officers bedecked with medals and wearing big hats, it is the British and American (and increasingly German) middle ranking staff officers behind the scenes who actually make the thing work. The only air force that is technologically capable of full integration with an American air campaign is that of the British, at least for the present.
Currently both countries are united in support for Ukraine. This is not entirely unselfish, for if we do not provided Ukraine with the means to resist Russian aggression, then we may well have to do it ourselves. A squadron of Challenger II tanks, provided by the British, is not a game changer, but it is a signal to our partners that the time has come to provide weapons that will allow Ukraine to take back territory now under Russian occupation, rather than simply remaining on the defensive. The American main battle tank, the Abrams, came into service in the early eighties, but has undergone several upgrades since. Due to its prodigious fuel consumption (two gallons to a mile, compared to one third of a gallon for Challenger II) and its weight of sixty-eight tons (sixty-two for Challenger II) the Abrams may not be suitable for Ukraine. Assuming that the British need to retain Challenger II, in service from 1998, for their own army in case the war widens, the ideal tank for the Ukrainian armed forces would be the German Leopard II, which is currently in service with the German army and ten other NATO or NATO-applicant members. All tanks are a compromise between the requirements of firepower, protection and mobility. The British, with a small, traditionally all-volunteer army, have always placed protection (that is, effectiveness of armour) higher than mobility. The Germans, drawing on their experience in the Second World War, believe that mobility is more important, thus reducing the risk of being destroyed by anti-tank weapons. Most countries in possession of the Leopard II are willing to donate some to Ukraine, but part of the sales agreement with Germany is that these cannot be transferred to a third party without German agreement. At the time of writing Germany has not agreed to a transfer, although she is being pressurised to do so. German reasons for withholding, or delaying, agreement to transfer Leopards to Ukraine are partly a wish to not entirely discard a policy of rapprochement with post-Soviet Russia, partly the fear that German panzers in action against Russia will revive memories of the Second World War, and partly the fact that Germany is still reliant on Russia for some of her oil and gas, although attempting to reduce and eventually eliminate this. Poland has threatened to supply Leopard to Ukraine whether Germany agrees or not, but that could only work if the Polish supply of spare parts is sufficient, as Germany could presumably refuse to supply more.
Whatever the outcome of German decision making, the USA and the UK will continue to work together to ensure that Russian imperial ambitions are thwarted. This includes not only the supply of military hardware, and the training of Ukrainians in its use, but also basic training of Ukrainian infantry recruits. The British army, with Canadian help, currently puts 2,400 Ukrainians at a time through a five week combat infantryman course, adapted to Ukrainian conditions, in a number of locations in the UK. Both the US and the UK also provide trainers and advisors in Ukraine and both provide intelligence to the Ukrainian forces.
In 2016 the election of what some saw as an ill-educated and unhinged egomaniac as the next president of the USA, with his thinly veiled threats to withdraw from NATO, did cause concern in Britain. One thing that President Trump did get right, however, was his assertion that Europe did not pay enough for her own defence. The UK has the second largest defence budget in NATO, but the USA still spends twice as much per head of the population than do the British. It would not be surprising if a return of Trumpism or similar risked a reduction in the American commitment to European security, particularly if China, rather than Russia, becomes the main focus of American defence policy.
All that said, however much the British may sometimes despair of American naiveté, neo conservatism or heavyweight tactics, the only ally that matters for Britain is the United States, and the only ally for America that has a global capability and is even halfway reliable is the United Kingdom. If we in Britain wish to have any influence on American actions it is essential that when America goes to war then Britain goes with her, even if we may not always agree with the casus bellum.